Speaker: Arkadii Slinko
Affiliation: The University of Auckland, Mathematics
Title: Dagstuhl and manipulation by cloning candidates
Date: Thursday, 18 Mar 2010
Time: 3:00 pm
Location: Room 401
Firstly I will give my brief impressions of Dagstuhl meeting on Foundations of Computational Social Choice which took place last week. Then I will talk about an article written jointly with Piotr Faliszewski and Edith Elkind which I presented it at the workshop. Here I will give more details.
Abstract of the article
We consider the problem of manipulating elections via cloning candidates. In our model, a manipulator can replicate each candidate c by adding its several clones, i.e., new candidates that are so similar
to c that each voter simply replaces c in his vote with the block consisting of c and its clones. The outcome of the resulting election may then depend on how each voter orders the clones within the block. We formalize what it means for a cloning manipulation to be successful (which turns out to be a surprisingly delicate issue), and, for a number of prominent voting rules, characterise the preference profiles for which a successful cloning manipulation exists. We also consider the model where there is a cost associated with producing each new clone, and study the complexity of finding a minimum-cost cloning manipulation.