## Hierarchical simple games, Structure and Characterisations

#### Ali Hameed and Arkadii Slinko

Department of Mathematics The University of Auckland

21 Feb 2012

## Secret Sharing Schemes (SSS's)



## Secret Sharing Schemes (SSS's)



#### Definition

A *SSS* is a method of distributing shares to a number of participants, so that a subset of participants can determine the secret if and only if that subset is authorised to do so.

• The collection of authorised subsets is called *access structure*.

- The collection of authorised subsets is called *access structure*.
- From Game Theory perspective, an access structure is a *simple game*, and authorised subsets are *winning coalitions*.

- The collection of authorised subsets is called *access structure*.
- From Game Theory perspective, an access structure is a *simple game*, and authorised subsets are *winning coalitions*.







#### Player A

#### Player B



Player A Share  $S_1 = 6$  Player B Share  $S_2 = 4$ 







Secret S = 10



A SSS is called *perfect* if unauthorised coalitions receive zero information about the secret.



#### Secret S < ab

#### Player A

#### Player B



Secret S < ab

Player A  $S_1 = S \mod a$  Player B  $S_2 = S \mod b$ 



#### Secret S < ab

#### Player A Player B $S_1 = S \mod a$ $S_2 = S \mod b$ Solve using the Chinese Remainder Theorem



#### Secret S < ab

#### Player A Player B $S_1 = S \mod a$ $S_2 = S \mod b$ Solve using the Chinese Remainder Theorem

And this scheme is not perfect

 Length of a share or secret is the number of bits used to write it.



 Length of a share or secret is the number of bits used to write it.



#### Definition

A perfect SSS is called *ideal* if the length of the share is equal to the length of the secret.

 Length of a share or secret is the number of bits used to write it.



#### Definition

A perfect SSS is called *ideal* if the length of the share is equal to the length of the secret.

Examples of ideal SSS are numerous, in particular, hierarchical SSS that will be considered later are ideal.

#### Problem

Characterise all ideal simple games.



#### Problem

Characterise all ideal simple games.

• This problem turned out to be extremely difficult, so the focus shifted to some subclasses of ideal simple games.

#### Problem

Characterise all ideal simple games.

- This problem turned out to be extremely difficult, so the focus shifted to some subclasses of ideal simple games.
- The first subclass is called Weighted Simple Games (WSG), introduced by [von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944].

#### Problem

Characterise all ideal simple games.

- This problem turned out to be extremely difficult, so the focus shifted to some subclasses of ideal simple games.
- The first subclass is called Weighted Simple Games (WSG), introduced by [von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944].

#### Definition (Weighted simple games)

Let  $w_1, \ldots, w_n$  be a system of non-negative weights and  $q \ge 0$ . We define

$$\Gamma = \{X \in \mathbf{2}^U \mid \sum_{i \in X} w_i \geq q\}.$$

Hierarchical simple games, Structure and Characterisations

#### Example

An electronic fund transfer of a large sum of money can be authorised by either:

- two general managers, or
- three senior tellers, or
- one general manager and two senior tellers.

If the two general managers have weights  $w_{1a} = w_{1b} = 3$ , and If the three senior tellers have weights  $w_{2a} = w_{2b} = w_{2c} = 2$ , such that q = 6, then this is a weighted game.

• Ideal WSG's have been characterised.

- Ideal WSG's have been characterised.
- A player whose removal from a winning coalition keeps the colaition winning is *Dummy*.



- Ideal WSG's have been characterised.
- A player whose removal from a winning coalition keeps the colaition winning is *Dummy*.



• The characterisation is for simple games with no dummies.

- Ideal WSG's have been characterised.
- A player whose removal from a winning coalition keeps the colaition winning is *Dummy*.



• The characterisation is for simple games with no dummies.

#### Theorem (Beimel, Tassa and Weinreb, 2008)

A WSG  $\Gamma$  is ideal iff one of the following three conditions holds:

- Γ is a hierarchical simple game of at most two levels;
- Γ is a tripartite simple game;
- Γ is a composition of two ideal WSG's.

#### Definition (Roughly Weighted (RWSG))

If X ∈ 2<sup>U</sup> is such that ∑<sub>i∈X</sub> w<sub>i</sub> > q, then X is authorized (belongs to Γ);

#### Definition (Roughly Weighted (RWSG))

- If X ∈ 2<sup>U</sup> is such that ∑<sub>i∈X</sub> w<sub>i</sub> > q, then X is authorized (belongs to Γ);
- If  $Y \in 2^U$  is such that  $\sum_{i \in Y} w_i < q$ , then Y is not authorized.

#### Definition (Roughly Weighted (RWSG))

- If X ∈ 2<sup>U</sup> is such that ∑<sub>i∈X</sub> w<sub>i</sub> > q, then X is authorized (belongs to Γ);
- If  $Y \in 2^U$  is such that  $\sum_{i \in Y} w_i < q$ , then Y is not authorized.
- If  $Z \in 2^U$  is such that  $\sum_{i \in Z} w_i = q$ , then a tie-breaking rule will decide whether the set is authorized or not.

#### Definition (Roughly Weighted (RWSG))

- If X ∈ 2<sup>U</sup> is such that ∑<sub>i∈X</sub> w<sub>i</sub> > q, then X is authorized (belongs to Γ);
- If  $Y \in 2^U$  is such that  $\sum_{i \in Y} w_i < q$ , then Y is not authorized.
- If  $Z \in 2^U$  is such that  $\sum_{i \in Z} w_i = q$ , then a tie-breaking rule will decide whether the set is authorized or not.



#### Definition (Roughly Weighted (RWSG))

- If X ∈ 2<sup>U</sup> is such that ∑<sub>i∈X</sub> w<sub>i</sub> > q, then X is authorized (belongs to Γ);
- If  $Y \in 2^U$  is such that  $\sum_{i \in Y} w_i < q$ , then Y is not authorized.
- If  $Z \in 2^U$  is such that  $\sum_{i \in Z} w_i = q$ , then a tie-breaking rule will decide whether the set is authorized or not.



#### Problem

Characterise all ideal RWSGs.

# The natural class of Hierarchical simple games (HSG's)



#### Figure: An m-level hierarchical simple game

## Disjunctive hierarchical simple game (DHSG)

#### Definition

In a DHSG, a coalition of participants is authorised if it contains at least  $k_1$  members from level 1, *or*  $k_2$  members from levels 1 and 2, *or*  $k_3$  members from levels 1, 2 and 3 etc.

#### Definition

In a DHSG, a coalition of participants is authorised if it contains at least  $k_1$  members from level 1, *or*  $k_2$  members from levels 1 and 2, *or*  $k_3$  members from levels 1, 2 and 3 etc.

#### Example

An electronic fund transfer of a large sum of money can be authorised by either:

- two general managers, or
- three senior tellers, or
- one general manager and two senior tellers.

So it is two levels:

The general managers  $L_1$  with  $k_1 = 2$ , and The senior tellers  $L_2$  with  $k_2 = 3$ .

#### Definition

In a CHSG, a coalition of participants is authorised if it contains at least  $k_1$  members from level 1, and  $k_2$  members from levels 1 and 2, and  $k_3$  members from levels 1, 2 and 3 etc.

#### Definition

In a CHSG, a coalition of participants is authorised if it contains at least  $k_1$  members from level 1, and  $k_2$  members from levels 1 and 2, and  $k_3$  members from levels 1, 2 and 3 etc.

#### Example

A passage of a resolution in the United Nations Security Council requires the vote of at least:

- 9 members in total, and
- at least 5 permanent members.

So it is two levels:

The permenant members  $L_1$  with  $k_1 = 5$ , and The non-permanent members  $L_2$  with  $k_2 = 9$ .

#### Definition

The simple games G and  $G^d$  are duals of each other if the winning coalitions of  $G^d$  are the blocking coalitions of G.

#### Definition

The simple games G and  $G^d$  are duals of each other if the winning coalitions of  $G^d$  are the blocking coalitions of G.

#### Theorem

DHSG's and CHSG's are duals of each other.

#### Definition

The simple games G and  $G^d$  are duals of each other if the winning coalitions of  $G^d$  are the blocking coalitions of G.

#### Theorem

DHSG's and CHSG's are duals of each other.

#### Example

The DHSG k=(2,4), n=(2,4), is the dual game of the CHSG k=(1,3), n=(2,4)

#### Definition

The simple games G and  $G^d$  are duals of each other if the winning coalitions of  $G^d$  are the blocking coalitions of G.

#### Theorem

DHSG's and CHSG's are duals of each other.

#### Example

The DHSG  $\mathbf{k} = (2, 4)$ ,  $\mathbf{n} = (2, 4)$ , is the dual game of the CHSG  $\mathbf{k} = (1, 3)$ ,  $\mathbf{n} = (2, 4)$ {1<sup>2</sup>, 2} is blocking in DHSG and is winning in CHSG, {1, 2<sup>2</sup>} is blocking in DHSG and is winning in CHSG.

## Weighted DHSG's

A *trivial level* is a level whose players either form authorised coalitions individually, or they are dummies.

A *trivial level* is a level whose players either form authorised coalitions individually, or they are dummies.

#### Theorem (Beimel, Tassa and Weinreb, 2008)

A HSG is weighted iff it has up to four levels but only two non-trivial. The non-trivial levels  $L_i$ ,  $L_{i+1}$  must have either:

• 
$$k_{i+1} = k_i + 1$$
, or

• 
$$n_{i+1} = k_{i+1} - k_i + 1$$
.

A *trivial level* is a level whose players either form authorised coalitions individually, or they are dummies.

#### Theorem (Beimel, Tassa and Weinreb, 2008)

A HSG is weighted iff it has up to four levels but only two non-trivial. The non-trivial levels  $L_i, L_{i+1}$  must have either:

• 
$$k_{i+1} = k_i + 1$$
, or

• 
$$n_{i+1} = k_{i+1} - k_i + 1$$
.

• An analogue of the above theorem for CHSG's is found by Duality.

In an access structure Γ, *i* is said to be more senior than *j*, formally *i* ≽<sub>Γ</sub> *j*, if *X* ∪ {*j*} ∈ Γ implies *X* ∪ {*i*} ∈ Γ for every set *X* ⊆ *U* not containing *i* and *j*. The game is called *complete* if ≿<sub>Γ</sub> is a total order.

- In an access structure Γ, *i* is said to be more senior than *j*, formally *i* ≿<sub>Γ</sub> *j*, if *X* ∪ {*j*} ∈ Γ implies *X* ∪ {*i*} ∈ Γ for every set *X* ⊆ *U* not containing *i* and *j*. The game is called *complete* if ≿<sub>Γ</sub> is a total order.
- A *shift* is a replacement of a player by a less senior one.



- In an access structure Γ, *i* is said to be more senior than *j*, formally *i* ≿<sub>Γ</sub> *j*, if *X* ∪ {*j*} ∈ Γ implies *X* ∪ {*i*} ∈ Γ for every set *X* ⊆ *U* not containing *i* and *j*. The game is called *complete* if ≿<sub>Γ</sub> is a total order.
- A *shift* is a replacement of a player by a less senior one.



• A *shift-maximal* coalition is a losing coalition whose every superset is winning and cannot be obtained from any losing coalition by a shift.

## Which HSGs are roughly weighted but not weighted?

The main tool in the characterisation:

#### Theorem

The class of disjunctive hierarchical simple games are exactly the class of complete games with a unique shift-maximal losing coalition. The main tool in the characterisation:

#### Theorem

The class of disjunctive hierarchical simple games are exactly the class of complete games with a unique shift-maximal losing coalition.

• An analogue of the above theorem for CHSG's is also found by Duality.

#### Theorem

A DHSG is roughly weighted if and only if it has up to three non-trivial levels, such that:

#### Theorem

A DHSG is roughly weighted if and only if it has up to three non-trivial levels, such that:

• If it has two levels  $L_i$ ,  $L_{i+1}$ , then  $k_{i+1} = k_i + 2$ ;

#### Theorem

A DHSG is roughly weighted if and only if it has up to three non-trivial levels, such that:

- If it has two levels  $L_i$ ,  $L_{i+1}$ , then  $k_{i+1} = k_i + 2$ ;
- If it has three levels, then some restrictions apply to the number of players of each level;

#### Theorem

A DHSG is roughly weighted if and only if it has up to three non-trivial levels, such that:

- If it has two levels  $L_i$ ,  $L_{i+1}$ , then  $k_{i+1} = k_i + 2$ ;
- If it has three levels, then some restrictions apply to the number of players of each level;

#### Example

(i) 
$$k_1 = 2, k_2 = 3, k_3 = 4$$
, with  $n_1 = 2, n_2 = 2, n_3 = 3$  denoted  $k = (2, 3, 4), n = (2, 2, 3);$ 

#### Theorem

A DHSG is roughly weighted if and only if it has up to three non-trivial levels, such that:

- If it has two levels  $L_i$ ,  $L_{i+1}$ , then  $k_{i+1} = k_i + 2$ ;
- If it has three levels, then some restrictions apply to the number of players of each level;

#### Example

(i) 
$$k_1 = 2, k_2 = 3, k_3 = 4$$
, with  $n_1 = 2, n_2 = 2, n_3 = 3$  denoted  $k = (2, 3, 4), n = (2, 2, 3);$   
(ii)  $k = (3, 4, 6), n = (3, 3, 3).$ 

#### Theorem

A DHSG is roughly weighted if and only if it has up to three non-trivial levels, such that:

- If it has two levels  $L_i$ ,  $L_{i+1}$ , then  $k_{i+1} = k_i + 2$ ;
- If it has three levels, then some restrictions apply to the number of players of each level;

#### Example

(i) 
$$k_1 = 2, k_2 = 3, k_3 = 4$$
, with  $n_1 = 2, n_2 = 2, n_3 = 3$  denoted  $k = (2, 3, 4), n = (2, 2, 3);$   
(ii)  $k = (3, 4, 6), n = (3, 3, 3).$ 

 A characterisation for the Roughly weighted CHSG's is also found by Duality.

## **THANK YOU !**